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TORT LAW-GOVERNMENT LIABILITY-STRICT LIABILITY UN
DER THE MASSACHUSETTS TORT CLAIMS ACT-Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 258 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the July 20, 1978 enactment of the Massachusetts Tort
Claims Act l (MTCA), Massachusetts was one of five jurisdictions
retaining a strict doctrine of government immunity.2 The MTCA,
similar in some respects to the Federal Tort Claims Act3 (FTCA) ,
abolished the common-law doctrine of government immunity.4 Al
though the government clearly is liable in negligence under the
MTCA, 5 whether strict liability may be applied to government ac
tivity is still open for discussion.
This note will examine both the propriety of applying strict lia
bility to government activity in Massachusetts and the sources of
authority for doing so. These issues will be clarified by a prelimi
nary discussion of two topics: The history of government immunity
from its common-law roots to its legislative abolition and the
common-law doctrine of strict liability.
1. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). The Massachusetts
Tort Claims Act [hereinafter referred to as MTCA] was an amendment to the Gen
eral Laws, replacing the earlier version of chapter 258.
§ 1. Definitions ...
"Public employer", the commonwealth and any county, city, town or
district, and any department, office, commission, committee, council, board,
division, bureau, institution or agency thereof [which] exercises direction
and control over the public employee, but not a private contractor with any
such public employer, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, the
Massachusetts Port Authority, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, or any
other independent body politic and corporate.
§ 2. Liability; ...
Public employers shall be liable for injury or loss of property or per
sonal injUly or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any public employee while acting within the scope of his office or employ
ment, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual un
der like circumstances, ... and shall not be liable for ... any amount in ex
cess of one hundred thousand dollars ....
2. Note, Governmental Tort Immunity in Massachusetts: The Present Need for
Change and Prospects for the Future, 10 SUFFOLK L. REV. 521, 524 (1976). The
other four jurisdictions were Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id.
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976).
4. Note, Sovereign Immunity in Massachusetts, 13 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877, 877
(1978).
5. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West Cum. Supp. 1980).
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HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY

Massachusetts Law Prior to the MTCA
Prior to the MTCA's enactment, government immunity in
Massachusetts had two components: Sovereign immunity and mu
nicipal immunity.s The United States Supreme Court first recog
nized sovereign immunity in dicta in the 1821 case of Cohens v.
Virginia. 7 The doctrine was widely accepted because it furthered
two public policies. The first of these policies was to free govern
ment administration from the hindrance of liability for acts per
ceived by the public as tortious. 8 Second, sovereign immunity
guaranteed that public funds raised through taxation were used to
benefit the general public and not to compensate individuals who
suffered tortious injury as a result of government activity. 9 Under
lying these policies was the belief that, even if such compensation
were appropriate, the expense to the government would be crip
pling.lO Massachusetts' common-law sovereign immunity rule, reit
erated most recently in Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth U
in 1973, stated that the state is immune from tort liability unless it
consents to be sued by either statute or supreme judicial court de
cree. 12
The second kind of government immunity recognized in the
Commonwealth, municipal immunity, originated in Mower v. In
habitants of Leicester. 13 The municipal corporation in Mower was
found immune from common-law tort liability for neglect of a duty
owed to the general public that caused injury to an individual. 14
. From its origin in Mower, municipal immunity in Massachusetts
developed two facets.15 First, when the municipality assumed a
function of the state for the benefit of the general public, the mu
nicipality also "borrowed" the state's sovereign immunity. IS The
A.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Note, supra note 2, at 522.
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 369 (1821).
Note, supra note 2, at 532.
Id.
10. Id.
II. 363 Mass. 612, 296 N.E.2d 461 (1973).
12. Id. at 615, 296 N.E.2d at 463. The earlier version of MASS. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 258 (West 1959) provided that certain miscellaneous and relatively minor
claims could be satisfied only with the government's consent.
13. 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
14. Id. at 249.
15. Cambridge v. Commissioner, 357 Mass. 183, 186, 257 N.E.2d 782, 785
(1970).
16. Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 380 (1877).
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second facet of municipal immunity developed from a principle ex
pressed in Bolster v. City of Lawrence: 17 if a municipal act is for
the common good and the municipality gains no special corporate
advantage or profit from it, the municipality is immune from lia
bility regardless of its assumption of a state function. 18 The histor
ical discussion of municipal immunity19 in Whitney v. City of
Worcester 20 presented the ultimate common-law rule on the sub
ject: a municipality is immune from liability for injuries resulting·
from the tortious acts of its officers or employees when they are
performing public functions, whether the functions are required or
permitted by the legislature, and when no particular corporate ad
vantage, pecuniary profit, or enforced contribution from particu
larly benefitted individuals results. 21
Whitney incorporated one theme set forth previously in
Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Comrrwnwealth: 22 Abolition of the immu
nity defense. In 1973 Morash forecasted the end of government
immunity though the supreme judicial court refrained from abol
ishing the defense at that time. The court stated that, although it
had the power to abrogate government immunity, abolition was a
task better suited to the legislature. 23 In the four years following
this hint to the legislature, however, the court declined three op
portunities to abrogate government immunity.24 During this period
17. 225 Mass. 387, 114 N.E. 722 (1917).
18. Id. at 390, 114 N.E. at 724.
19. Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 213-14, 366 N.E.2d 1210,
1213-14 (1977).
20. 373 Mass. 208, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977).
21. Id. at 214-15, 366 N.E.2d at 1214-15. The exceptions to municipal immunity
created by the statutes and case law lessened the harshness of municipal immunity,
which had left tortiously injured plaintiffs totally without a remedy. An action for re
lief from unwarranted exclusion of a child from public school was created by statute.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 16 (West 1969). The statutes created an action for
damages for personal injury a:nd property loss resulting from road defects. Id. ch. 84,
§ 15. Similarly, an action for damages for loss of life resulting from road defects was
created by statute. Id. ch. 229, § 1. The statute also provided an action allowing re
covery for property damage resulting from riot. Id. ch. 269, § 8 (repealed 1962). In
Kurtigian v. City of Worcester, 348 Mass. 284, 203 N.E.2d 692 (1965), plaintiff, who
was hit by a tree limb from a negligently maintained tree on city property, was al
lowed to recover on a theory of private nuisance despite the city's immunity from
negligence actions. In Miles v. City of Worcester, 154 Mass. 511, 28 N.E. 676 (1891),
an encroaching city wall was held to constitute a nuisance for which the city was
found strictly liable despite immunity from an action in trespass.
22. 363 Mass. 612, 296 N.E.2d 461 (1973).
23. Id. at 624, 296 N.E.2d at 468.
24. In Hannigan v. New Gamma-Delta Chapter of Kappa Sigma Fraternity,
Inc., 367 Mass. 658, 327 N.E.2d 882 (1975), plaintiff pleaded, in part, that her fall
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the legislature unsuccessfully attempted to pass several abolition
bills. 25
In Whitney, decided in 1977,26 the court took two major steps
toward the abolition of government immunity. The court an
nounced that government immunity would be abrogated judicially
if the legislature did not make a pronouncement in the area by the
end of the next legislative session. 27 Whitney also intimated that
judicial abrogation might be retroactive to Morash. 28 According to
one commentator, the legislature feared that retroactive abrogation
of government immunity would have an adverse effect on the vot
ers and taxpayers.29 The dicta in Whitney, threatening retroactive
abrogation, thus provided impetus for legislative action. 30
The Whitney court took a second major step toward the aboli
tion of government immunity by proposing a scheme of govern
ment liability.3! Under Whitney judicial inquiry would shift from
the nature of the government enterprise as a whole to the specific
act or omission complained of as tortious. 32 Whitney discarded gov
ernment immunity but also suggested the limits of liability. 33
Whitney chose to immunize those government activities that
traditionally had fallen within the discretionary function excep
and injury on a state college campus were due to the negligence of the Common
wealth. The court stated that it would continue to refrain from abolishing govern
ment immunity until the legislature either acted or demonstrated an intent not to act.
Id. at 662, 327 N.E.2d at 885. In Caine v. Commonwealth, 368 Mass. 815, 335
N.E.2d 340 (1975), plaintiff, who sought damages in a wrongful death action, claimed
that the death of her intestate was caused by the state's negligence in failing to re
move an unnatural accumulation of ice from a highway. The court again refused to
abolish government immunity, noting that the legislature had not yet demonstrated
an intent of inaction. Id. at 816, 335 N.E.2d at 341. Accord, Piotti v. Commonwealth,
370 Mass. 386, 348 N.E.2d 425 (1976), in which Plaintiff appealed from a judgment
awarding her maximum compensation under the Crime Victim's Compensation Act,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A (West Cum. Supp. 1981) and sought additional
damages. Plaintiff alleged that the state's negligence in allowing two juveniles to es
cape from custody caused the death of the decedent. The court refused to override
the legislature's statutory limitation of the Commonwealth's liability, which was es
sentially a partial immunity. 370 Mass. at 388,348 N.E.2d at 427.
25. Note, supra note 4, at 877.
26. 373 Mass. at 208,366 N.E.2d at 1210.
27. Id. at 210,366 N.E.2d at 1212.
28. ld.
29. Johnedis, The Supreme Judicial Court and Tort Immunity, 63 MASS. L.
REV. 75, 81 (1978).
30. ld.
31. 373 Mass. at 216, 366 N.E.2d at 1215.
32. ld. at 218, 366 N.E.2d at 1216.
33. ld. at 216, 366 N.E.2d at 1215.

1981)

MASSACHUSETTS TORT CLAIMS ACT

613

tion. 34 Thus, immunity was established for acts involving discretion
and judgment and the weighing of policy alternatives. 35 The
Whitney court proposed seven factors that could be used to de
termine whether liability should attach: Categorization of the tor
tious conduct as government planning or policymaking; endanger
ment of efficient government process by imposition of tort liability;
usurpation of executive or legislative power through judicial review
of the conduct; availability of an alternative remedy other than an
action for damages; reasonable expectations of the injured person
with respect to the responsible government entity; the nature of
the duty running between the government and the individual; and
the nature of the injury.36 The court concluded that, in cases where
these seven factors are not determinative, government liability
should be the general rule. 37 Whitney, in holding that government
liability was the general rule, set the stage for the enactment of the
MTCA.

B.

The MTCA

As a result of the judiciary's prodding in Whitney the legisla
ture enacted the MTCA on July 20, 1978. 38 The MTCA holds pub
lic employers liable for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions
of their employees in the same manner as a private individual un
der similar circumstances. 39 The MTCA defined the term "public
employer" broadly to include the numerous government entities in
the Commonwealth. 40
A primary rule of statutory interpretation is that strong consid
eration should be given to legislative intent4 1 as manifested in a
specific statement of purpose or as implied from legislative his
tory.42 The objective is to interpret a statute in accordance with
the stated or implied intent of the enacting body. 43
Though the legislative history of the MTCA is virtually nonex
34. Id. at 217,366 N.E.2d at 1216.
35. Id. at 218-19, 366 N.E.2d at 1216.
36. Id. at 219,366 N.E.2d at 1217.
37. Id.
38. See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. See note 1 supra for text of §§ 1
& 2 of the MTCA; notes 104-05 infra for §§ 4 & 5; note 117 infra for § 10; and note
109 infra for § 11.
39. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
40. Id. § 1.
41. United States Y. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 53 (1942).
42. United States y. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941).
43. United States y. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 53-54 (1942).
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istent,44 the legislature's intent may be drawn from specific state
ments of purpose. Very brief statements of purpose are found in
two places. The sponsors of the original bill stated that their pur
pose was "to abolish government immunity."45 The session laws46
delineate the scope of construction: "[t]he provisions of this act
shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes
thereof. . . . "47 These brief statements of legislative intent suggest
that the legislature wanted the MTCA to be construed liberally to
abolish government immunity. When the MTCA is construed lib
erally, strict liability becomes applicable to government activity.
Because section 2 of the MTCA states in part that the government
is "liable . . . in the same manner . . . as a private individual,"48
strict liability as applied to individuals must be examined to clarify
the issues underlying strict liability's application to the govern
ment.·

III.

DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY

Strict liability has been defined as liability without fault. 49 The
concept of fault, violation of a standard of due care, became the
most important component of liability in Anglo-American law dur
ing the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen
turies. ~o In 1868, however, a gradual erosion of the fault concept
began. 51 In Rylands v. Fletcher 52 the House of Lords held that
those who use their land in unusual and extraordinary ways should
provide some protection to their neighbors for losses that might
occur. A common theme recurred as the fault doctrine was eroded
and the doctrine of strict liability arose: liability began to be as
44. Note, supra note 4, at 879. The bill originated in the House as H.R. 1394 on
January 4, 1978. A survey of numerous sources, including the bill's sponsors, the Leg
islative Research Bureau in Boston, and the Committee on the Judiciary, unearthed
no historical material which gives a definitive statement of legislative intent.
45. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES H.R. 1394,2330 (1978).
46. "Session laws" is the name given to the body of laws enacted by a state
legislature at one of its annual or biennial sessions. The term session laws is used to
distinguish the body of laws from the compiled or revised statutes of the state.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (5th ed. 1979).
47. 1978 MASS. ACTS ch. 512, § 18.
48. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
49. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1591 (4th ed. 1968).
50. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 75,492 (4th ed. 1971).
5l. Id. at 494 n.25 (referring to Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 E. & I. App. 330
(1868)).
52. L.R.3 E. & I. App. 330 (1868).
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,
signed not so much on the basis of fault but on the basis of who
could best bear the risk. 53
In general tort law, strict liability may be applied to six types
of individual activity. When a nuisance arises and it creates an ab
nonnally dangerous situation, strict liability is triggered. 54 Abnor
mally'dangerous trespassory activity similarly invokes the, applica
tion of strict liability. 55 Strict liability is also available to
compensate injured individuals in the areas of abnonnally danger
ous activity, 56 products liability,57 workmen's compensation, 58 and
dangerous animals. 59
Of the six major areas of individual strict liability, only two .are
relevant to the discussion in this note: nuisance and abnonnally
dangerous activity. The supreme judicial court has rejected strict
liability in trespass 60 and products liability.61 Workmen's compen
sation is governed by a statutory provision that is distinct from
the MTCA.62 Dangerous animals do not represent a significant
problem within the Commonwealth. 63
53. W. PROSSER, supra note 50, § 75, at 495.
54. Id. § 87, at 575-76; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822, Comment a
(1965).
55, W. PROSSER, supra note 50, § 13 at 63-64.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 45, at §§ 519-520.
57. Id. § 402A.
58. W. PROSSER, supra note 50, § 80, at 525.
59. Id. § 76, at 496.
60. No litigation concerning the application of strict liability in trespass has
been reported in Massachusetts. Moreover, application of this type of strict liability
has been tacitly foreclosed by Miles v. City of Worcester, 154 Mass. 511, 28 N.E. 676
(1891), discussed at note 21 supra.
61. Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 629, 378 N.E.2d 61, 62
(1978). The legislature's adoption of the most liberal warranty alternative in the
Massachusetts version of the Uniform Commercial Code, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
106, § 2-318 (West Cum. Supp. 1981), is evidence that the legislature adopted the
spirit of § 402A. Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 639, 378 N.E.2d 964, 968
(1978). The Uniform Commercial Code section holds the manufacturer, sell or, lessor,
or supplier liable for breach of express or implied warranty, regardless of privity
with the plaintiff, if the injured party was one whom the defendant could reasonably
have expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 106, § 2-318 (West Cum. Supp., 1981). The Swartz court found an endorsement
of § 402A unnecessary: strict liability for injury caused by defective products in
Massachusetts will be applied only through breach of warranty. 375 Mass. at 629,
378 N.E.2d at 62.
62. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
63. Dangerous animals would most likely be found in a zoo or wildlife pre
serve. The number of private or government owned or operated enterprises of this
type within the Commonwealth is quite small. The most recently reported case in
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The court, however, has applied strict liability to nuisance 64
and abnormally dangerous activity.65 Nuisance that creates an ab
normally dangerous situation may be considered under the general
classification of abnormally dangerous activity. 66 The difference be
tween an abnormally dangerous nuisance and an abnormally dan
gerous activity per se lies not in any concept of liability but in rem
edy. Nuisances may be remedied in three ways: The court may
award the plaintiff damages for deprivation of the use and enjoy
ment of his land; the court may enjoin the nuisance; or the plaintiff
may undertake the self-help remedy of abatement. 67 Abnormally
dangerous activity, however, is remedied only through damages. 68
On the other hand, liability is identical for abnormally dangerous
nuisances and abnormally dangerous activities per se. The focus of
this note is on liability; therefore, abnormally dangerous nuisance
activity will be considered subsumed into abnormally dangerous ac
tivity.
Individuals engaged in abnormally dangerous activity are held
strictly liable for damage and injury because society has made a
judgment that the social utility of the activity is outweighed by the
risk of harm it poses. 69 The rationale behind strict liability is that
the price to be paid for engaging in abnormally dangerous activity
is liability without fault. 70

the Commonwealth involving strict liability and dangerous animals arose in 1960
when a zebra escaped from the Eastern States Exposition. Smith v. Jalbert, 351
Mass. 432, 435-36, 221 N.E.2d 744, 746 (1966).
64. For a discussion of nuisance in Kurtigian and Miles, see note 24 supra. The
court has specifically applied strict liability in nuisance to government activity.
Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. at 614, 296 N.E.2d at 463. The
maintenance of large, uncontained supplies of road salt within a populated area in
Morash qualified as "conduct which is abnormal and out of place in its surround
ings," W. PROSSER, supra note 50, § 87, at 574, and thus constituted strict liability in
nuisance.
65. The Rylands doctrine was accepted by the court in Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass.
582 (1868), cited in Clarke-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., Inc., 367 Mass. 70, 76,
323 N.E.2d 876, 879 (1975). In Clarke-Aiken, the court accepted the position of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 54, at §§ 519-520 concerning strict li
ability and abnormally dangerous activity. [d. at 89-91,323 N.E.2d at 886-87.
66. See note 54 supra.
'
67. W. PROSSER, supra note 50, §§ 90 at 602-06.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 54, at § 519, Comment d.
69. W. PROSSER, supra note 50, § 75, at 494-95. Social utility is measured by
the benefits which the actor and the community derive from the activity. Id. at 495.
70. Comment, Absolute Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 MIL.
L. REV. 53, 55 (1973).
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STRICT LIABILITY AND GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY

Statutory approaches to government liability vary among the
jurisdictions and form a continuum.71 At one end of this continuum
is New York, which considers government liability the norm and
immunity the exception. 72 California appears at the opposite end of
the spectrum with government immunity as the norm and specific
liabilities the exception. 73 Several jurisdictions along the contin
uum create a private strict liability cause of action for abnormally
dangerous activity and apply such liability to government activity.
New York,74 Oregon,75 and Washington76 all accept strict liability

71. Note, supra note 2, at 543.
72. [d.
73. [d.
74. New York recently endorsed a strict liability cause of action against the
government in Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 440, 448, 368 N.E.2d
24, 27, 398 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (1977). Strict liability is limited, however, by the re
quirement that the defendant's activity be shown to be the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries. [d. at 453,368 N.E.2d at 30,398 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
75. Oregon, while not specifically endorsing the application of strict liability to
government activity, has applied the concept to individual activity which is
ultrahazardous. McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255 Or. 324, 327, 467 P.2d
635, 637 (1970). The Oregon Supreme Court, however, tacitly recognized strict liabil
ity actions a,gainst the government in its exceptionally broad construction of the
Oregon Tort Claims Act. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.260-300 (1973), contrued in Dow
ers Farms, Inc. v. Lake County, 288 Or. 669, 607 P.2d 1361 (1980).
The court in Dowers Farms stated:
[T]he Tort Claims Act was intended to be remedial legislation, allowing all
citizens to seek redress for any tort committed by their governments, except
for specific immunities listed in the statutes . ... A narrow statutory con
struction of the provisions of the Tort Claims Act would be contrary to its
general remedial purposes.
288 Or. at __, 607 P.2d at 1367 (emphasis added). Nowhere in the Oregon statute is
the government immunized against strict liability for ultrahazardous activity.
76. A Washington Supreme Court decision, Edgar v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 217,
222-23, 595 P.2d 534, 539, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1077 (1979), used the same
rationale as the Oregon decision, holding that the State of Washington, under its
statutes, is liable for damages arising from any tortious activity if the plaintiff can
show that a private cause of action exists for the factual situation at hand. The
Washington Supreme Court has indicated several times that a private cause of action
exists in strict liability for ultrahazardous activity. The most recent of these decisions
is Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855, 860-61, 567 P.2d 218, 221 (1977). In
an earlier case, Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 59, 64, 491
P.2d 1037, 1040 (1971), the court was on the verge of applying strict liability to gov
ernment activity but declined to do so because the activity in that case was not
deemed ultrahazardous. It is interesting to note that the court felt that the plaintiff's
case was a meritorious one and granted relief on a theory of res ipsa loquitur. [d. at
67, 491 P.2d at 1041. See also notes 82-90 infra and accompanying text.
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to some degree within their tort claims acts. In California, where
one would expect the immunity norm to rule out strict liability,
the courts and legislature have applied the doctrine in practice
. without specifically endorsing it. 77 The federal government7 8 and
Iowa,79 however, have excluded strict liability from their tort
claims acts.
.
Professor Marc Franklin, a prominent torts scholar, has writ
ten that California and New York tort decisions are influential and
rarely atypical. 8o Further, decisions from those two states usually
become models for other states to follow. 81 A trend may be devel
oping since abnormally dangerous government activity has been sub
jected to strict liability to some degree in four of the six jurisdic
tions where the issue has been litigated and since New York and
California are among those four states. Whether Massachusetts will
interpret its tort claims act to encompass strict liability for govern
ment's abnormally dangerous activities will be considered below in
two stages: The first addresses the general policies that might
justify strict liability; the second delves into the sources authorizing
Massachusetts courts to apply strict liability to government activity.
V.

JUSTIFICATION FOR APPLYING STRICT LIABILITY

TO GOVERNMENT ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY

A.

Argument for Strict Liability

Holding the government strictly liable for its abnormally dan
gerous· activities eliminates four major problems associated with
77. California accepted the application of strict liability to private ultra
hazardous activity under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 54, § 519
in Orser v. George, 252 Cal. App. 2d 660, 672-73, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708, 717 (1967). The
California Tort Claims Act, CAL. GOY'T CODE §§ 810-996 (West 1980), has been in
terpreted to allow recovery in nuisance cases involVing aircraft noise. The court in
Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 937, 496 P.2d 480, 491, 101 Cal. Rptr.
568, 579 (1972), held that the government was liable, under the Tort Claims Act,
CAL. GOY'T CODE § 815 (West 1980), for aircraft noise since it was a nuisance under
CAL. GOY'T CODE § 3479 (West 1980).
78. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802-03, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 902
(1972).
79. Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Iowa 1977).
80. M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIYES
xix (2d ed. 1979).
81. [d. A concurring opinion in a California case, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), is considered to be the origin of the doc
trine of strict liability for defective products. The decision by the New York Court of
Appeals in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), is con
sidered to be the leading tort case on proximate cause.
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compensating tortiously injured individuals. First, an innocent, tor
tiously injured individual still has a claim even though a remedy is
not available in strict liability. To provide compensation, the judici
ary must engage in the inequitable and convoluted process of cir
cumventing strict liability. 82 The courts, including those in
Massachusetts,83 grant relief by straining other doctrines84 such as
res ipsa loquitur,85 trespass,86 nondelegable duty,87 taking of prop
erty,88 and nuisance. 89 None of these theories, however, provides
total liability coverage for abnormally dangerous activity. As a re
sult, liability for abnormally dangerous activity is determined on a
case-by-case basis. Plaintiff's recovery is directly proportionate to
his skill in manipulating the facts to conform to one of the causes of
action mentioned above.
Rejecting strict liability also subverts a major purpose underly
ing the abolition of government immunity:9o To relieve injured in
dividuals from bearing the costs of the government's torts. 91
Placing this burden on an individual is inconsistent with the values
embraced by a democratic society.92
Without a strict liability cause of action, tort issues that
should be litigated in the courts are handled by other, less appro
priate procedures. 93 As a result, relief may be obtained only by
submitting private bills for compensation to the legislature. 94 The
legislature has granted damage awards only in the wake of major
catastrophes. An example is the 1947 Texas City fertilizer explo
sions where 300 separate claims totalling two hundred million dol

82. Comment, supra note 70, at 71.
83. See the discussion of Kurtigian at note 21 supra.
84. Comment, supra note 70, at 70-71.
85. Jacoby, Absolute Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 FED. B.J.
5, 6 (1966), Comment, supra note 70, at 66.
86. Comment, supra note 70, at 67. See Reynolds, Strict Liability Under the
Federal Tort Claims Act: Does "Wrongful" Cover a Few Sins, No Sins or Non-Sins?,
23 AM. U. L. REV. 813, 818-19 (1974).
87. Comment, supra note 70, at 69.
88. Id. at 70.
89. Reynolds, supra note 86, at 818-19.
90. Note, The Supreme Court and the Tort Claims Act: End of an Enlightened
Era?, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 267, 283 (1978).
91. ld.
92. See generally Note, supra note 4, at 879 n.12.
93. Note, Torts-Federal Tort Claims Act-Sonic Boom-Cause of Action
Based in Absolute Liability Not Actionable Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 727, 732 (1973).
94. ld.
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lars were filed. 95 The United States Supreme Court denied recov
ery, forcing plaintiffs to seek relief in Congress by private bill. 96
The private bill procedure generally is considered to be inequitable
since tort issues may be subordinated to political considerations.
The sheer number of private bills, the inadequacy of legislative
factfinding tools, and pressure by the bills' proponents 97 all make
the legislature an inappropriate forum for resolution of tort issues.
Several tort claims acts have explicitly stated an intent to eliminate
the private bill procedure. 98
Unless a remedy is available in strict liability, therefore, the
government may engage in abnormally dangerous activity with
impunity. A major tenet of tort law, the regulation of conduct, 99
is thus emasculated. In 1944 California Supreme Court Justice
Roger J. Traynor discussed the policies that led him to apply strict
liability when a waitress was injured by an exploding bottle of Coca
Cola: loo public policy dictated that responsibility be fixed where
it would reduce hazards to life and health most effectively.IOI Al
though Justice Traynor was speaking in the context of products lia
bility, his reasoning is also pertinent ·to abnormally dangerous ac
tivity. Placing responsibility on the government would deter
carelessness in the government's pursuit of abnormally dangerous
activities.

B.

Arguments Against Strict Liability

The major argument against applying strict liability to govern
ment activity is the same one that was levelled against the abolition
of government immunity: costs are potentially staggering. I02 A

95. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 17 (1953).
96. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802 (1972). Although relief was granted by
private bill, the process was both costly and lengthy. ld.
97. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1951).
98. ld. (expressing the purpose of the FTCA); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 1 (Ct. CI. Act,
Hist. Note) (McKinney 1963).
99. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
436,440-41 (1944) (Traynor, ]., concurring).
100. ld. at 456, 150 P.2d at 437.
101. ld.
102. Note, supra note 2, at 532. In fiscal year 1964, when sovereign immunity
was still the law, 580 claims were filed against the Commonwealth under the limited
Massachusetts claims settlement procedure. Those claims were settled by the attor
ney general for slightly more than $110,000. MASS. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COUN
CIL, REP. ON SENATE BILL 990, 77 (January 1965). When one considers that the
Commonwealth has 14 counties, 39 cities, 312 towns, and numerous boards and
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leading commentator in this area considers this argument invalid
because the government may use general funds to compensate tort
victims and thereby distribute the costs through the tax system. l03
In Massachusetts compensation is limited by the MTCA. Sec
tion 4 of the Act requires that administrative remedies be ex
hausted before a lawsuit is initiated against the government. l04
Early settlement of claims is encouraged by section 5 of the Act,
which removes an external approval requirement for payment of
claims under $2,500 and requires only the approval of the govern
ment attorney for payment of claims between $2,500 and $20,000.
Settlements between $20,000 and $100,000 need be approved only
by the secretary of administration and finance. l05 The ultimate ef
fect of sections 4 and 5 of the Act is to direct claims from the
courts to administrative agencies. lOS
committees, the potentially staggering costs of unrestricted abolition of government
immunity become apparent. MASSACHUSETTS FACTS, 8 (1976).
103. Reynolds, supra note 86, at 833.
104. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
§ 4. Prerequisites to Civil Action; ... Limitation of Action
A civil action shall not be instituted against a public employer on a
claim for damages under this chapter unless the claimant shall have first
presented his claim in writing to the executive officer of such public em
ployer within two years after the date upon which the cause of action arose,
and such claim shall have been finally denied by such executive officer in
writing and sent by certified or registered mail, or as otherwise provided by
this section. The failure of the executive officer to deny such claim in writ
ing within six months after the date upon which it was presented, or the fail
ure to reach final arbitration, settlement or compromise of such claim ac
cording to the provisions of section five, shall be deemed a final denial of
such claim. No civil action shall be brought more than three years after the
date upon which such cause of action accrued. Disposition of any claim by
the executive officer of a public employer shall not be competent evidence
of liability or amount of damages.
105. [d.
§ 5. Arbitration, Compromise, Settlement, and Release of Claims; ...
The executive officer of a public employer may arbitrate, compromise or
settle any claim for damages under this chapter; provided, that any award,
compromise or settlement in excess of two thousand five hundred dollars
shall be made only with the prior approval of the public attorney for such
public employer; provided further, however, that in any case where the pub
lic employer is the commonwealth, any award, compromise or settlement in
excess of twenty thousand dollars shall be made only with the prior approval
of the secretary of administration and finance ....
106. It may seem incongruous to state that legislative settlement of claims is
unfair and yet to encourage administrative settlement. The two positions are consistent,
however. There is no alternative in the event of an unsatisfactory legislative settle
ment. Under the MTCA, on the other hand, an unsatisfactory administrative settle
ment offer may be rejected and a judicial remedy pursued. See note 104 supra.
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The possibility of staggering costs also is reduced by the maxi
mum recovery limit, $100,000 on each claim, set by the Act. 107 In
addition, the sting of damages is softened by section 8 of the
MTCA, which authorizes the government to purchase liability in
surance. 108
Section 11 of the MTCA promises to have the most chilling ef
fect on frivolous lawsuits. 109 In the event of a judgment against the
plaintiff and a determination by the court that the action was frivo
lous or in bad faith, the court may order judgment against the
plaintiff for costs. 110
In addition to these legislative limitations, several doctrinal
limitations also will prevent staggering costs. The supreme judicial
court considers strict liability feasible only if defendant's act or
omission is the proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. H1 The Re
statement (Second) of Torts (Restatement) provides the government
with two possible defenses: Assumption of risk;112 and, to a very
limited extent, contributory negligence. 113 When this note was
published, however, neither of these defenses to strict liability had
been accepted in Massachusetts.
The staggering costs argument against strict liability, there
fore, is unfounded because of the cost-limiting effects of both the
MTCA and the limitations imposed by the doctrines of proximate

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
[d. § 8.
[d.
Frivolous claims; costs; subsequent actions
If the judgment in any action brought under this chapter is in favor of
the public employer, judgment for costs and execution thereon may issue in
favor of the public employer, if the court finds the action brought by the
claimant to have been frivolous or in bad faith, and final judgment on the ac
tion shall be a bar to any other or further action being brought on the same
claim or subject matter.
llO. None of the other tort claims acts examined in this article has such a re
strictive provision. Although no statistics are yet available on the total amount of
claims paid under the MTCA, the chilling effect of §§ 4, 5, and II should reduce po
tential claims costs.
Ill. Clarke-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., Inc., 367 Mass. at 90 n.21, 323
N.E.2d at 887 n.21.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 45, at § 523. The plaintiff
must knowingly and voluntarily proceed to encounter the risk by coming within
range of it. [d. Comment e.
ll3. [d. § 524. In general, plaintiff is not barred from recovery in strict liability
by his or her own negligence. ld. In the infrequent circumstances when the plaintiff's
conduct consists of unreasonable and intentional exposure to a risk of harm from an
abnormally dangerous activity, he is barred from recovery. [d. Comment ~.
107.
108.
109.
§ ll.
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cause, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence. Denying a
strict liability cause of action is contrary to public policy and forces
injured individuals to resort to inappropriate theories of recovery.
Strict liability should be applied to the government in Massachu
setts since the argument opposing application is not convincing.
VI.

AUTHORITY TO APPLY STRICT LIABILITY

Under the MTCA the government is liable for "negligent or
wrongful acts or omissions. "114 Strict liability for abnormally dan
gerous activity is not mentioned. Authority, therefore, must be
drawn from the intent of the legislature and the language of the
Act. Two phrases within the Act seem to incorporate strict liability:
The phrase "wrongful act or omission" in section 2; and the phrase
"liable . . . in the same manner.. . . as a private individual, "115
also found in section 2.
The legislature did not intend to immunize the government
from claims in strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity.
Rather, the legislature wanted the Act to be liberally construed to
abolish government immunity.1 16 Specific immunities are list~d in
the Act: Discretionary function immunity; immunity in the execu
tion of statutory duties; and immunity for intentional tortS.117 None
of these immunities mentions or even alludes to strict liability or
abnormally dangerous activity.118
One of these immunities, the discretionary function exception,
has been used incorrectly119 by some federal courts 120 as a bar to
/

114. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
115. Id.
116. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
117. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 10 (West Cum. Supp. 1981) states:
§ 10. Application of sections one to eight
The provisions of sections one to eight, inclusive, shall apply to:
(a) any claim based upon an act or omission of a public employee when
such employee is exercising due care in the execution of any statute or any
regulation of a public employer, or any municipal ordinance or by-law,
whether or not such statute, regulation, ordinance or by-law is valid;
(b) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a public
employer or public employee, acting within the scope of his office or em
ployment, whether or not the discretion involved is abused;
(c) any claim arising out of intentional tort ....
118. See id. ch. 258.
119. See generally Peck, Laird v. Nelms, A Call fer Review and Revision of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 48 WASH. L. REV. 391,410-11 (1973).
120. See Abraham v. United States, 465 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1972); Maynard v.
United States, 430 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1970); McMurray v. United States, 286 F.
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strict liability recovery for government abnormally dangerous activ
ity. This exception immunizes from liability government activi
ties that involve judgment and choice of policy.121 Discretionary
function immunity is widespread among the various tort claims
acts 122 and is set out clearly in section lO(b) of the MTCA.123 Dis
cretionary function immunity is used to bar government strict lia
bility because the government decision to engage in abnormal~y
dangerous activity is based on the unlimited choice of competing
policies and objectives, the social utility of the activity, and the risk
of harm. 124
Discretionary function immunity is not a bar to government
strict liability in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts Supreme Judi
cial Court, in Clarke-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., 125 ac
cepted the Restatement formulations of abnormally dangerous activ
ity and strict liability.126 The court noted that under section 519,
one who carries on abnormally dangerous activity is subject to lia
bility for ensuing harm even though he has exercised the utmost
care to prevent such harm. 127 Section 520 then enumerates six fac
tors that contribute to a finding of abnormally dangerous activity:
High degree of risk of harm to person, land, or chattels of another;
possibility of great harm; inability to eliminate the risk through due
care; uncommon nature of the activity; inappropriateness of the ac
tivity to the place of conduct; and extent to which risks outweigh
social benefits. 128 The Clarke-Aiken court articulated the Restate
ment's test for determining when strict liability is appropriate:
U[i]n general, abnormal dangers arise from activities which are in
themselves unusual, or from unusual risks created by more usual
activities under particular circumstances ... The essential ques
tion is whether the risk created is so unusual, either because of
its magnitude or because of the circumstances surrounding it, as
to justify the imposition of strict liability for the harm which re
sults from it, even though it is carried on with all reasonable
care."129
Supp. 701 (W.O. Mo. 1968); Schwartz v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 164 (D.N.D. 1965);
Huslander v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D.N.Y. 1964).
121. Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373 Mass. at 216-17, 366 N.E.2d at 1215-16.
122. ld. at 217-18, 366 N.E.2d at 1216.
123. See note 117 supra for the text of § 10 of the MTCA.
124. See Peck, supra note 119, at 410.
125. 367 Mass. 70,323 N.E.2d 876 (1975).
126. ld. at 89, 323 N.E.2d at 886-87.
127. Id.
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 54, at § 520.
129. 367 Mass. at 89,323 N.E.2d at 886-87 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, supra note 54, at § 520 Comment f).
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The court stressed that the nature and extent of the risk rather
than the nature of the activity should be emphasized. 130 If the gov
ernment were to plead immunity from liability for abnormally dan
gerous activity under the discretionary function rule, focus would
shift to the nature and extent of the risk. Sections 519 and 520 of
the Restatement then would be invoked and a three-part test ap
plied.
Under the Restatement's test, the activity first must be deter
mined to be abnormally dangerous under the standard of section
520. If the activity is deemed abnormally dangerous, strict liability
is applied. Finally, even though the activity is deemed abnormally
dangerous and the defendant is held strictly liable, the activity
must be shown to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff' s inju~
ries. 131 Because of the shift in focus to the nature and extent of the
risk, the allegation of abnormally dangerous activity, under this
test, forecloses judicial inquiry into whether the activity was
undertaken as the result of a planning or policymaking decision.
When examination of that decision is foreclosed, the .discretionary
function immunity becomes inapplicable.
Only a handful of lower federal courts have used discretionary
function immunity as a bar to recovery in strict liability actions
against the federal government. 132 The United States Supreme
Court has not had the opportunity to consider discretionary func
tion immunity as a bar to strict liability recovery .133 Justice
Stewart, in dissent, however, asserted that the discretionary func
tion immunity is inapplicable as a bar to recovery in strict liability
against the federal government. 134 He stated that the purpose of
the discretionary function immunity is to prevent the possibility
that policy decisions made by the legislative or the executive
branches might be reviewed by the courts in the context of a tort
action. 13S Justice Stewart also stated that there is no such danger in
the area of abnormally dangerous activity because strict liability
causes of action look to the abnormally dangerous nature of the ac
tivity rather than the policy decision behind the undertaking. 136
130. Id. at 89-90,323 N.E.2d at 887.
131. See note III supra and accompanying text.
132. See note 120 supra.
133. In the one case in which the issue arose, Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797
(1972), the Court based its holding on a different rationale; therefore, consideration
of this issue was deemed unnecessary. Id. at 803.
134. Id. at 810 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 811.
136. Id. at 811-12.
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Once an activity is deemed abnormally dangerous, liability de
pends solely on the issue of causation. 137
Authority to apply strict liability to abnormally dangerous gov
ernment activity may be implied since the Massachusetts legisla
ture has not manifested a contrary intent. In fact, the legislature
specifically stated that the MTCA was to be given a liberal con
struction in order to abolish government immunity.13S No legisla
tive history associated with the MTCA indicates an intent to fore
close strict liability. An argument could be made that the
discretionary function exception is a tacit bar to strict liability. This
argument, used in the lower federal courts,139 has not been ad
dressed in a United States Supreme Court majority opinion and
has been dismissed as inapplicable in a Supreme Court dissenting
opinion. 140 Although the issue of whether discretionary function
immunity bars strict liability has not been litigated in
Massachusetts, the Commonwealth's case law strongly supports the
. conclusion reached by Justice Stewart: discretionary function im
munity is inapplicable as a bar to strict liability.141 Nor does legis
lative intent prohibit the application of strict liability to the govern
ment's abnormally dangerous activity. Therefore, implied authority
to incorporate that type of immunity must be found in the lan
guage of the MTCA.

A.

The Phrase "Wrongful Acts or Omissions"

'The first source of implied authority for applying strict liability
to Massachusetts state and municipal governments is construction
of the word "wrongful" in section 2 of the MTCA, which assigns
government liability for "wrongful acts or omissions. "142 Even in
the absence of Massachusetts precedent construing "wrongful," it is
inappropriate to draw upon existing federal precedent without a leg
islative directive to do so. Laird v. Nelms,143 decided by the Su
preme Court in 1972, construed the word "wrongful," which ap
pears in section 1346(b) of the FTCA. The Court rejected an
interpretation that would have resulted in the application of strict
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 812.
1978 Mass. Acts ch. 512 § 18.
See notes 119-120 supra and accompanying text.
Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 810-12 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id.
See note 1 supra.
406 U.S. 797 (1972).

1981)

MASSACHUSETTS TORT CLAIMS ACT

627

liability to the govemment. 144 Although the "wrongful" language in
the MTCA is similar to that in the FTCA, interpretation of the two
statutes should not necessarily be the same. Neither the legislative
history145 nor the language of the MTCA indicates whether the
legislature intended that the two acts be given a similar interpreta
tion. Legislative silence in this area may mean that the legislature
did not intend to follow federal interpretive precedent.
In one prior instance the Massachusetts. legislature told the
courts the weight to be given federal precedent by including a spe
cific requirement to follow federal precedent in the Massachusetts
statute. In the Consumer Protection Act,146 passed eleven years
before the MTCA, the legislature specifically directed the courts to
follow federal interpretive precedent. 147 The language of the Con
sumer Protection Act subject to federal interpretation is identical
to that in the Federal Trade Commission Act. The MTCA and the
FTCA, however, do not share the same language. 148 Because the
legislature specified in a statute the treatment to be accorded fed
eral precedent, legislative silence in this area with regard to the
MTCA probably indicates an indifference to federal cases that con
strue the FTCA.
Dicta from Packaging Industries Group v. Cheney,149 decided
in 1980 by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, although it
addresses the scope of direct appellate review, could be read to re
quire adherence to Laird v. Nelms. 150 The Packaging Industries
court stated that, when state statutory language "closely tracks" that
of a federal statute, the court will follow federal interpretive prece
dent. 15l The section 2 MTCA language, however, does not "closely
track" section 1346(b) of the FTCA. Two important differences dis
tinguish the superficially similar language of the two statutes. In
Poirier v. Superior Court,152 source of the Packaging Industries
dicta, the language of the Massachusetts statute being construed
was taken directly from the Norris-LaGuardia Act and inserted into
144. Id. at 802-03.
145. See notes 44-48 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of MTCA
legislative history.
146. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A (West 1972).
147.' Id. § 2(b).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
149. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1189,405 N.E.2d 106.
150. 406 U.S. at 797.
151. 1980 Mass Adv. Sh. at 1191,405 N.E.2d at 108-09.
152. 337 Mass. 522, 150 N.E.2d 558 (1958).
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the Massachusetts statute via amendment. 153 It is logical to as
sume, therefore, that the legislature wanted the Massachusetts
statute to parallel the federal act. In contrast, the MTCA did not
borrow language from the FfCA,154 so it can be argued that the
MTCA was not intended to parallel the FfCA. Under the Poirier
test, therefore, the language of section 2 of the MTCA does not
"closely track" that of the FTCA.
The second important difference between the language of sec
tion 2 of the MTCA and section 1346(b) of the FTCA is the context
in which the word "wrongful" is used in the two sections. The stat
utory language in section 1346(b) clearly indicates that federal gov
ernment tort liability is determined under the substantive tort law
of the jurisdiction where the cause of action accrued. 155 Section
1346(b) concerns a choice of law question; it does not describe the
scope of government liability. On the other hand, section 2 of the
MTCA, entitled "Liability," pertains to the scope of state and local
government liability in Massachusetts. Because the sectiOn 2 lan
guage is not used in the same context as the language in section
1346(b) and does not "closely track" the language of section
1346(b), the Packaging Industries dicta directing state courts to fol
low federal precedent is inapplicable. 15s
Application of the Packaging Industries dicta would have
brought the Nelms decision almost to the level of mandatory prece
dent. Without the Packaging Industries dicta, Nelms is merely per
suasive authority. As persuasive authority, Nelms must be evalu
ated prior to an application as interpretive precedent for the
MTCA.
Few courts have followed Nelms. 157 The decision has been
criticized widely and vociferously in law review articles. 158 Each of
153. ld. at 526-27, 150 N.E.2d at 561.
154. See notes 44-48 supra and accompanying text.
155. Peck, supra note 119, at 392.
156. Use of federal precedent to interpret the MTCA is appropriate in some
cases. The determinative factor is whether the particular MTCA language "closely
tracks" that of the FTCA. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1191,405 N.E.2d at 108-09.
157. Three courts have applied Nelms strictly to negate a cause of action·
against federal or state government in strict liability. Medley v. United States, 480 F.
Supp. r005, 1013 (M.D. Ala. 1979); McGarry v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 525, 531
(D. Nev. 1973); Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Iowa 1977).
158. At the time of publication, seven law review articles criticized the Nelms
decision: Peck, supra note 119; Reynolds, supra note 86; Comment, supra note 70;
Note, Torts-The Federal Tort Claims Act-Absolute Liability, The Discretionary
Function Exception, Sonic Boom, Laird v. Nelms, 92 S. Ct. 1899 (1972), 6 AKRON L.
REV. 105 (1973); Note, supra note 90; Note, Torts-A Definite Pronouncement on the
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the several bases of the Court's decision has been denounced.
The Nelms Court considered itself bound by dicta in Dalehite
v. United States. 159 Dalehite held that the federal government was
not liable for extensive damage resulting from fertilizer explosions
aboard two cargo vessels in the harbor of Texas City, Texas in
1947. 160 The Nelms Court determined that Dalehite bound it not to
hold the federal government strictly liable for damage resulting
from aircraft noise. 161 Dalehite's restriction of strict liability,162
however, was not a holding in the case but rather mere dicta. l63
Dicta is not subject to stare decisis. l64
Even if the Dalehite statement on strict liability were consid
ered a holding, it would have been restricted severely by Indian
Towing v. United States 165 and Rayonier, Inc. v. United States. 166
The Indian Towing Court held the federal government liable for
damages resulting from a negligently maintained lighthouse. The
Court stated that the FTCA was intended to compensate victims of
tortious government actiVity in circumstances similar to those ren
dering a private individual liable. 167 Lower courts were instructed
not to impose immunity onto a statute designed to limit immu
nity.168 Rayonier, which held the federal government liable for neg
ligence in .fighting a forest fire, reaffirmed the Indian Towing
test. 169 The Court also stated that Dalehite was rejected by Indian
Federal Tort Claims Act-Strict Liability· Eliminated, 9 GA. ST. B.J. 342 (1973);
Note, supra note 93, at 727. This author was unable to find a single law review arti
cle which evaluates Nelms as a sound and logical decision.
159. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
160. Id. at 17.
161. 406 U.S. at 802-03.
162. Id. at 44-45.
163. "[Lliability does not arise by virtue of either United States ownership of
an 'inherently dangerous commodity' or property, or of engaging in an 'extra hazard
ous' activity." 346 U.S. at 45. Commentators have construed this statement and the
discussion accompanying it as dicta. Peck, supra note 119, at 398; Reynolds, supra
note 86, at 816; Note, Torts-The Federal Tort Claims Act-Absolute Liability, The
Discretionary Function Exception, Sonic Boom, Laird v. Nelms, 92 S. Ct. 1899
(1972), supra note 158, at 107; Note, Torts-A Definite Pronouncement on the Fed
eral Tort Claims Act-Strict Liability Eliminated, supra note 158, at 348.
164. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 45, at 1261.
165. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
166. 352 U.S. 315 (1957). See also Peck, supra note 119, at 396; Comment, su
pra note 70, at 64-65; Note, Torts-The Federal Tort Claims Act-Absolute Liability,
The Discretionary Function Exception, Sonic Boom, Laird v. Nelms, 92 S. Ct. 1899
(1972), supra note 158, at 107-08.
167. 350 U.S. at 68.
168. Id. at 69.
169. 352 U.S. at 319.
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Towing to the extent that it contradicted Indian Towing. 17o United
States v. Praylou,171 decided by the United States Court of Ap
peals for the Fourth Circuit, also was cited in Rayonier as support
for Indian Towing's narrowing of Dalehite. 172 In Pray lou , the
Fourth Circuit held the government strictly liable under North
Carolina law for damages from an airplane crash. 173 The Nelms ma
jority opinion rejecting strict liability did not mention the Indian
Towing and Rayonier restrictions of Dalehite or Rayonier's tacit ap
proval of strict liability for government activity.
The legislative history of the FTCA, which was relied upon by
the Dalehite and Nelms Courts to determine legislative intent with
regard to government strict liability, is inconclusive at best. 174
Three different versions of the FTCA's legislative history, one in
the Dalehite majority opinion, one in the Nelms majority opinion,
and one in the Nelms dissent, are cited regarding congressional in
tent concerning the application of strict liability to the federal gov
ernment. The Dalehite version of the FTCA legislative history was
drawn from Senate committee discussion that took place during
the Seventy-sixth Congress indicating that "wrongful" was intended
to cover actions, such as trespass, that were not strictly negli
gent. 175 The Court in Nelms cited a House committe.e memoran
dum discussing a Seventy-seventh Congress House draft bill. 176
This 1942 draft bill included a discretionary function exception
which exempted planning and policymaking decisions and value
judgments from review to prevent suits against the government for
legally authorized acts. The draft was never enacted into law. 177
Nelms' dissent cited legislative history from the 1946 bill that was
passed and enacted into the FTCA.178 Joint committee discussion
indicates that the bill was designed to establish a uniform system
permitting actions to be initiated on " 'any tort claim . . . with the
170. [d.
171. 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953).
172. 352 U.S. at 319 n.2.
173. 208 F .2d at 295.
174. Reynolds, supra note 86, at 815-16; Note, Torts-The Federal Tort Claims
Act-Absolute Liability, The Discretionary Function Exception, Sonic Boom, Laird v.
Nelms, 92 S. Ct. 1899 (1972), supra note 158, at 108.
175. 346 U.S. at 45.
176. 406 U.S. at 801-02 (citing to Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 at 65-66 (1942)).
177. 406 U.S. at-801-02.
178. [d. at 805-07.
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exception of certain classes of torts expressly exempted from the
operation of the act.' "179
Of these three versions, the one that is most convincing is
that cited by the Nelms dissent. Although the other statements of
legislative history are relevant, the history that is most recent
and most closely associated with the statute is determinative. 18o
Since the version cited by the Nelms dissent has the most weight,
congressional intent may be inferred to allow a cause of action in
strict liability against the federal government. This congressional
intent would make the Nelms holding on strict liability incorrect
and the Nelms decision useless in interpreting the MTCA. "Wrong
ful" may therefore be construed to include strict liability.
Massachusetts case law does not specifically define what con
stitutes a "wrongful" act. In Massachusetts, however, a tortious act
is defined as one that will subject the actor to subsequent liabil
ity.l8l Under section 519 of the Restatement, accepted in
Massachusetts,182 abnormally dangerous activity subjects the actor
to strict liability. Abnormally dangerous activity, therefore, is tor
tious. Tortious activity is widely defined as wrongful activity.183
Thus, since abnormally dangerous activity is both tortious and
wrongful, it is actionaple under the phrase "liable for . . . wrongful
acts or omissions"184 which appears in section 2 of the MTCA.
B.

The Phrase "Liable in the Same Manner . ..
as a Private Individual"

The phrase "liable in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances, "185 which appears
in section 2 of the MTCA, mandates the use of strict liability
against the government. Since strict liability for abnormally danger
179. Id. at 806-07.
180. See Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 254 (1956) (construing the Portal to
Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 254, 251-262 (1976».
181. Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. at 621, 296 N.E.2d at
467; Rogers v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 265 Mass. 544, 546-47, 164 N.E. 463, 463
(1929).
182. Clarke-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., Inc., 367 Mass. at 89-90, 323
N.E.2d at 886-87.
183. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 45, at 1335. See Howard's Adm'r v.
Hunter, 126 Ky. 685, 689-90, 104 S.w. 723, 724 (1907); Judson v. Peoples Bank &
Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 91, llO A.2d 24, 35 (1954); Kelly v. Mohrhusen, 50
Wis. 2d 337, 341, 184 N.W.2d 149, 151 (1971).
184. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
185. Id.
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ous activity is a viable private cause of action in Massachusetts, 186
it could be applied to government activity under section 2 of the
MTCA.
Use of the phrase "liable . . . as a private individual" was pro
posed as the test of federal government liability in both Indian
Towing v. United States 187 and Rayonier, Inc. v. United States. 188
In the jurisdictions that allow a cause of action in strict liability
against the government,189 the Indian Towing test is used to con
struct a scheme of government liability that parallels that of a
private individual.
Use of the phrase "liable . . . as a private individual" as a
source of authority most likely will be criticized in Massachusetts
as a construction that is not commensurate with the legislature's
original intention. This criticism is unfounded with regard to the
MTCA. The legislature stated a brief but specific intent that "The
provisions of this act shall be construed liberally for the accom
plishment of the purposes thereof,"190 that purpose being "to abol
ish government immunity."191 At least three jurisdictions use the
Indian Towing test to allow a strict liability cause of action against
the government. 192 The section 2 phrase "liable . . . as a private
individual" supports application of the Indian Towing test in
Massachusetts.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Massachusetts was one of the last five states to retain govern
ment tort immunity. The doctrine of government immunity,
consisting of sovereign and municipal immunity, was firmly en
trenched in Massachusetts until 1973. In five decisions from 1973
to 1977 the supreme judicial court hinted to the legislature that ab
olition of government immunity was a task better suited to the leg
islature than to the judiciary. As a result of these hints the MTCA
finally was enacted on July 20, 1978. The MTCA specifically allows
recovery against the government on a negligence theory but not on
a strict liability theory.

186. See note 65 supra.
187. 350 U.S. 61,61 (1955).
188. 352 U.S. 315, 315 (1957); see notes 167-172 supra and accompanying text.
189. See notes 72-77 supra and accompanying text.
190. See notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text.
191. Id.
192. Those jurisdictions are New York, Oregon, and Washington. See notes
74-76 supra.
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Strict liability is liability without fault. It is applicable when
the social utility of an activity is outweighed by the risk of harm.
Under American tort law in general, whether a jurisdiction takes
an expansive approach to government liability, as New York does,
or a restrictive approach, as California does, strict liability is a suit
able cause of action when the government engages in abnormally
dangerous activity.
Strict liability will eliminate the difficulties currently facing
Massachusetts courts. In the absence of strict liability the courts
must resort to inappropriate legal theories to grant relief to tor
tiously injured plaintiffs. Relief should be granted in a direct strict
liability cause of action: innocent individuals then will be compen
sated for injuries caused by the government's abnormally danger
ous activities. In addition, relief will be granted through judicial
rather than legislative proceedings. Finally, the government will be
compelled to exercise a higher standard of care in the conduct of
abnormally dangerous activities.
Nothing in Massachusetts statutes or case law explicitly allows
or explicitly bars strict liability actions against the government for
abnormally dangerous activity. Implied authority, however, may be
drawn from two phrases in the language of section 2 of the MTCA.
The phrase "wrongful acts or omissions" may be construed to in
clude strict liability. The phrase "liable ... as a private individual"
has been proposed as the test for federal tort liability and is the
test for government liability in several jurisdictions that allow
strict liability actions against the government.
The judiciary and the legislature might choose not to recog
nize the section 2 language as an implied source of authority for
strict liability's application to the government. If those two
branches of government view the arguments with disfavor, it will
be incumbent upon the legislature to mandate the application of
.strict liability to government abnormally dangerous activity in
Massachusetts. The application of strict liability transfers the cost of
abnormally dangerous government activity from the innocent vic
tims of the activity to the government and ultimately to the general
public, which benefits from the activity.
Massachusetts has taken a great step forward with the enact
ment of the MTCA. The Commonwealth's progress in compensa
ting tortiously injured individuals should continue through judicial
recognition or legislative provision of a cause of action against the
government in strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity.

Joseph H. Reinhardt

